This article critically examines several dimensions of the Bangladeshi migration to Assam, beginning with the historical background and the factors that led to the Assam Movement. It is argued that the seeds of the apparent failure of deporting illegal Bangladeshis were already implanted in Assam Accord. An analysis of the numbers of the Bangladeshi migrants in Assam and the problems of ascertaining such numbers has been carried out. The impact of large-scale migration on Assamese culture and politics is discussed in view of the balkanisation of the ethnic groups in Assam. Attention has been drawn to the dangers of geopolitics in terms of the proposed North East economic zone. Lastly, a relatively conciliatory and accommodating approach to solve the Bangladeshi issue has been suggested in light of the fact that historical events have overtaken some significant provisions of the 28-year old Assam Accord.
Introduction
The objective of this article is to analyse the various aspects of the burning issue of illegal immigration from Bangladesh into Assam and to consider the practical viability of the various suggested policies in light of historical reality and international relations. The article begins with the historical background of the Assam Movement (1979 Movement ( -1985 . This is followed by a discussion of the Assam Accord signed in 1985 and a critical examination of how practical and realistic the provisions of the Assam Accord are. It then examines the controversy regarding the estimated number of migrants from Bangladesh to Assam during the last 40 years and reviews some recent work. This is followed by an analysis of the progress of the implementation of the provisions of Assam Accord, which critically notes the failure of the Government of Assam and that of the Central Government to implement some important agreed clauses of the Accord. Then the article discusses the political consequences and the likely impacts of the perceived large-scale immigration from Bangladesh on the identity of the indigenous people followed by a critical analysis of geopolitical implications of the same. Lastly, it examines policies that have been put forward by various sections of the Assamese society and makes some concluding remarks suggesting a relatively conciliatory stance in view of historical osmosis and human rights. March 1971 will be detected and deleted from the electoral rolls, but after a period of 10 years following the detection, the names of all such persons will be included in the electoral rolls. Irregular issuance of Indian Citizenship will be looked into, and certificates will be issued only by the authorities of Central Government. To stop further infiltration, the border will be made more secure with barbed wire fencing, patrols by security forces on land and riverine routes will be intensified, and adequate number of check posts will be set up. A road along the international border will be constructed to facilitate patrolling. Furthermore, relevant laws for prevention of encroachment of Government lands and lands in tribal belts and blocks will be strictly enforced, and encroachers will be evicted. On the economic front, the Accord promised to establish an Oil Refinery and one I.I.T, and to help to reopen Ashok Paper Mill and Jute Mills.
Historical Background
The Accord was constrained by the Indira-Mujib Treaty 17 of 1971 whereby India agreed to take responsibility of all migrants who entered India on or before 24 th March 1971. Thus, the illegal immigrants who entered before that cut-off date obtained citizenship automatically. The detection-deletion-deportation process as envisaged in the Accord does appear to be only an aspiration rather than a firm policy of action in view of the fact that nobody knew how many illegal Bangladeshis were in Assam at that point of time (to be discussed in the next section); and therefore the scale of the administrative and judiciary resources required to implement that policy were hardly considered. In addition, not a moment's thought was given to whether Bangladesh would accept returnees at a large scale from Assam because no international agreement or treaty on this exists between India and Bangladesh. The detect-delete-deport policy was clearly not implementable without some form of international treaty with Bangladesh, and a reality check should have been done at the level of Central Government before signing the Accord. This throws some doubts about whether the Government of India was serious about achieving a satisfactory resolution to the Bangladeshi issue or whether the Central Government signed the Accord simply to placate the people of Assam.
On the other hand, it was a blatant mistake not to include representatives from the tribal communities, the Adivasis and the Assamese Muslims. Their non-participation in the process of negotiations weakened the Accord's political relevance and legitimacy. These groups of people largely distanced themselves from the Accord over time.
The economic hand-outs of an oil refinery and an I.I.T, however, were concrete actionable proposals. May that Saikia's party depended on Muslim votes, and warned that it would take "just five minutes for the Muslims of Assam to throw Hiteswar Saikia out". Two weeks later, on 7 th June 1992, while addressing a meeting of the All Assam Minority Students Co-ordination Committee at Juria (near Nagaon); Mr Hiteswar Saikia did a volte-face and announced that there was "not a single illegal migrant in Assam". A rational explanation of this bizarre episode has never been given to the people of Assam either by Hiteswar Saikia or by his political party.
The Number Game
On 6 th May 1997, Indrajit Gupta, the then Home Minister, declared in the Parliament that there were 10 million illegal migrants in India. In 1998, it was published in India Today ( migrants, on the assumption that legal international migrants will correctly state their place of birth. Thus, the difference between the total number of international migrants and the total number of legal international migrants is an estimate of the number of illegal international migrants. Their research has revealed some interesting figures [Goswami et al. (2003) , Table 3 ]. In 40 years from 1951 to 1991, the total number immigrants to Assam is 2.9 million out of which 0.9 million (31%) are interstate immigrants and 2 million (69%) are international immigrants. Out of 2 million international immigrants, 0.69 million (24%) are legal and 1.3 million (45%) are illegal international migrants.
In an interesting article, Borooah (2013) If we use this figure for the said 40 years, the total number of immigrants will be 3.13 million. Thus, the figure expectedly varies depending on the choice of the year. One would need data for each year from 1969 to 2009 (or from 1971 to 2011) to make an accurate estimate. As the natural rate of growth is fairly stable over the medium term, one can make a guesstimate that the accurate figure for migrants is likely to be between 2 and 3 million between 1971 and 2011. Sinha (1998) estimated that 1.5 million Bangladeshis lived in Assam in 1992. If we extrapolate Sinha's estimated figure at the natural rate of 2.2% up to 2000, and then at 1.85% up to 2011, we get an estimate of 2.18 million.
It is also important to consider what has been happening in Bangladesh where the actual rate of growth of population was 2.0% and the natural rate of growth of population was 2.2% in 1995. Therefore, there was net outflow (emigration) from Bangladesh at an annual rate of 0.2%. The 1995 population of Bangladesh was 124 million. Therefore, we can estimate that 248,000 Bangladeshis emigrated in 1995. Again, on the basis of the drastic assumption that emigration took place at that rate for 40 years from 1971 to 2011, we find that 9.9 million Bangladeshis left their country in four decades. This, of course, does not reveal how many came to Assam. However, a fair fraction of the land hungry poor Bangladeshis did come to Assam as evidenced by illegal occupation of land in Assam. Gogoi (2005) ; and the whereabouts of the rest 10,492 persons was not known to the government. This is what is going on for the last 28 years.
The biggest hurdle in deporting illegal immigrants is the Illegal Migrant (Determination by Tribunals) Act 1983 (IMDT Act) which was passed by the Congress Government. The transparent flaw of the Act was that the onus of furnishing proof against a suspected foreigner rests on the complainant and not on the accused. Furthermore, the complainant has to pay a punitive charge to complain. And worse, a ration card is taken as sufficient proof of domicile status. The IMDT Act was, as Ravi (2012) says, "mischievously legitimized" in the Assam Accord. Sinha (1998) suggested to the President of India that the IMDT Act should be repealed and that the Foreigners' Act of 1946 should be used for detection and deportation of foreigners. In 2005, after 22 years, the Supreme Court of India struck down the IMDT Act and observed that the Act "has created the biggest hurdle and is the main impediment or barrier in the identification and deportation of illegal migrants". 1971-1991 and 1991-2001 in the following highgrowth districts (first and second figure respectively for 1971-91 and 1991-2001) :Goalpara (4.0%, 2.9%), Kamrup (3.8%, 2.8%), Darrang (5.7%, 3.3%), Lakhimpur (4.9%, 2.8%), Nagaon (3.9%, 3.1%), Sivasagar (3.6%, 2.6%), Karbi Anglong (5.6% 7.4%), and North Cachar Hills (20.5%, 4.0%) and Cachar (2.3%, 2.7%). These figures reveal that, with the exception of Nagaon, the rate of growth of Muslim population during the 1990's is higher in districts where the proportion of Muslim population is relatively lower. This indicates that immigrants move to newer territory (with lower proportion of Muslim population) in Assam. Second, not only the districts bordering Bangladesh, namely, Dhubri and Karimganj, have higher ratios of Muslim population, but also from Dhubri, Muslim population has spilled over to the other western districts, namely, Goalpara and Barpeta, and from Karimganj to Hailakandi. The population density (people per km 2 ) has increased in these districts. District concentration of Muslim population has strong political impact in a democracy. The alleged use of Bangla votes to prop up the Congress to form state government will have some truth in it, if it is found that politicians encouraged foreigners to get registered in the voting rolls. Names of foreigners in the voting lists were found at least in one case, which triggered the Assam Movement. Secondly, with the advent of a strong Muslim political party, namely, the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF), with the pledged mandate that they will look after the welfare of the Muslims (both  Bangladeshi  and migrants. An area of 16,455 bighas of land in the Binji Tribal block in Kokrajhar District has been encroached by about 3000 illegal nontribal families. This is not a fiction of imagination; one can visit this area for confirmation of facts. Thus, the Government of Assam has failed its constitutional obligations.
There is a further complication here. When riots took place recently in Bodoland against the Muslim Bangladeshis, the indigenous Muslims also became victims of violence. But the land rights of the indigenous Muslims must also be protected. All over rural Assam, the land rights of the indigenous population is the crucial issue created by legal or illegal migrants' illegal occupation of land. The root cause of the Nellie violence was also triggered by land rights of the Lalungs. The indigenous communities in Assam do fear that their identity is threatened, specifically when alleged Jihadi forces 28 protect the illegal Muslim migrants.
An ethnically heterogeneous Assam is progressively getting ethnically divided in terms of tribe-specific autonomous councils, and many demand their own states to be carved out of Assam. This ethnic balkanisation is fundamentally a consequence of policy of appeasement to emphatic assertion of tribal ethnicity, when the emphatic assertion takes the form of violence perpetrated by organised terrorist groups. Therefore, when one says that the Assamese identity is threatened by the migrants, it is not clear who are included as being Assamese. For example, the Bodos claim that the Bodos are not Assamese; so do the Karbis. During the British Raj, and specifically during the independence struggle, a form of social osmosis developed as all ethnic groups were fighting for a single cause; but soon after independence, the social political cohesiveness steadily disintegrated over two or three decades. This is largely because the "mainstream" middle class Assamese, who dominated the politics of Assam in the postindependence days, failed to accommodate the aspirations of the tribal people. Even after the Assam Movement, the AGP government, formed by the young leaders of the movement, did not accommodate, for example, the aspirations of the co-leaders from the Bodo community.
In a state where multitude of ethnic groups lived for centuries while maintaining its own cultural ethnic identity, one has to refer to the Assamese culture as the combined collection of all the cultures, with minimum cultural mix. "Who is an Assamese?" is a very difficult question to answer. Does language or religion bind us together? Assamese language is predominant, but many ethnic groups will not describe Assamese as their own mother tongue as they have developed their own language and literature. In Britain, if you live in Britain and you have British citizenship, you are British; but you could be British Assamese or British Ugandan. Thus, we can argue that one who lives in Assam and who is an Indian citizen is an Assamese; one could be Assamese Punjabi or Assamese Gujarati. But language plays an important role in the definition of who an Assamese is. A person who does not speak Assamese will not be referred to as an Assamese in the context of India with a multitude of provincial languages. Religion is an over-arching pan-India factor that does not bind the Assamese as a cultural group, perhaps with the exception of the rejuvenated Sankari culture involving not only the "mainstream" Assamese but also many from the ethnic minorities. Muslim culture is different from the Hindu culture, and even among the Hindus, the Vaishnavs are different from the Brahmins. The core Assamese culture historically is based on the contributions of Mahapurush Srimanta Sankardev.
Can the Brahmaputra and Rongali Bihu, romantically associated with Assam, override the dividing forces of ethnicity and religiosity and inspire to form or define Assamese identity (jati) or sub-nationalism in concordance with Indian nationalism? During the Assam Movement, the Assamese nationalism manifested itself in large processions and other non-violent protests, because there was a cause that bound people from all ethnic groups together. But, as Baruah (1999) Assam with high proportions of Muslim population, which are situated along the Bangladeshi border, will be vulnerable for Jihadi activities possibly leading to a political scenario similar to that in Kashmir. The Government of India seems to be oblivious to such possibilities.
Concluding Remarks
The sacrifice of the Assamese people during the Assam Movement now appears to have been in vain. The Assam Accord, a document not passed by the Parliament, is now outdated as events have overtaken it. The seeds of its failure were already in the document, namely, the IMDT Act 1983, the lack of robust administrative machinery with commensurate resources, and the lack of an appropriate treaty with Bangladesh. It may be noted that, during the Prime Minister's visit to Bangladesh in 2011, a total of 64 agreements were signed between the two countries, but there was no discussion about the Bangladeshi migrants to the North East. We have no expectation that detection and deportation will take place, detection and deletion may still take place. More than quarter of a century has passed, and as time passes, it becomes relatively more difficult to follow the policy enshrined in the Accord. The policy should be switched to prevention of further infiltration, keeping in mind the first soundings for a greater Bangladesh. Also, empirical evidence reveals that the flow from Bangladesh has somewhat slowed down. As economic development takes place in Bangladesh and land to population ratio in Assam increases, the inward flow of migration from Bangladesh will naturally end. Illegal occupation of land is the most important issue, particularly, the occupation of land in the tribal belts and blocks. There is fairly significant evidence that the Bangladeshis migrate to Assam to find land; and therefore clashes in the rural areas are inevitable and this is the reason why there are clusters of Bangladeshis. The policy should be to disperse the Bangladeshis to all parts of the North East, and some government land has to be allotted to them for settlement. Also, there should be attempts to wean them out of the land intensive activities
